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  Competition litigation in the EU and the United Kingdom after the 2014 Antitrust damages 
directive: balancing the demands of a sound administration of justice with the need for more 
effective private competition enforcement through fair and effective evidence disclosure 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The question of how to facilitate the private enforcement of the competition rules has been a much 
vexed issue for the EU institutions as well as for the Member States.  At Union level, these discussions, 
which have been ongoing since the early 1990s, have eventually culminated in the enactment in 2014 
of a Directive aimed at laying down common rules governing competition damages actions.  The 
Directive lays out common rules in a number of areas, ranging from standing to limitation periods, to 
the interaction between adjudication and the out-of-court resolution of these disputes.  One of its 
central objectives is to correct the information asymmetry often existing between litigants and 
affecting the ability of the "weaker" one (usually the plaintiff) to secure the evidence that is both 
relevant and necessary to prove his or her case.  To achieve this goal the Directive provides for the 
minimum harmonisation of the rules governing the discovery of evidence that is held by either another 
litigant or by a third party: in addition, to ensure that the exercise of these rights does not unduly 
interfere with the effectiveness of public enforcement, it contains special rules in respect of requesting 
access of documents held by National Competition Authorities (NCAs).  Nonetheless, the circumstance 
that this harmonisation is only "minimal" raises issues as to how the Directive's rules are destined to 
"impact" on the existing domestic rules and more generally to interact with the EU principle of national 
autonomy.   
            This paper considers the extent to which the 2014 Directive aims to pursue the prima facie 
concurring objectives of on the one hand making civil competition litigation a “realistic” option for all 
plaintiffs and on the other hand safeguarding the role of the national competition authorities (NCAs) 
in the detection and sanction of new infringements against the background of established EU 
principles as well as of the domestic rules in force in individual member states .  Starting from an 
examination of its rationale, the paper will discuss the approach adopted by the Directive in respect 
of the disclosure of evidence in civil proceeding as a means of correcting the imbalance between 
plaintiffs and defendants as regards the availability of relevant documentary proof.  Thereafter, the 
rules governing specifically the disclosure of documents gathered by competition agencies as a result 
of a leniency application will be discussed.  It will be argued that on the one hand, it may be acceptable 
to restrict the scope of the principle of ‘equality of arms’, which is fundamental for the fairness of 
domestic litigation throughout the Union, to ensure the effective detection of anti -competitive 
behaviour.  On the other hand, it will be submitted that the approach adopted by the Directive may 
not be easy to reconcile with the principle of national autonomy and in particular with its tenet of 
effectiveness, as interpreted by the EU Court of Justice in recent decisions.  
         It will be concluded that the 2014 Directive should on the whole be welcomed as a concrete effort 
toward greater access to justice in an area of complex litigation, especially for claimants; nonetheless, 
it is also clear that whether this measure is going to be successful will depend on the outcome, in the 
national laws of each Member State, of its implementation, due to the differing rules governing many 
of the issues that the Directive tackles and, consequently, of the underlying tension between the 
commitment to achieving a common purpose and the continuing relevance of the principle of national 
autonomy. 
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2. Access to justice in private competition enforcement cases in the EU between convergence 
and national autonomy—a complex story 
 
2.1. Collective actions and private competition enforcement—from “hard harmonisation” 
attempts to the choice of “moral suasion”… and from the particular to the general!  
 
The limited remit of this contribution does not allow for the in-depth examination of the debate on 
how to facilitate the bringing of private claims on the part of victims of competition infringements for 
the purpose of seeking redress of the loss suffered as a result.  It is now accepted that having the right 
to seek compensation for the loss caused by anti-competitive practices, recognised by the Court of 
Justice of the EU (CJEU) in the Crehan and Manfredi decisions, is central to the efficient and coherent 
application of the Treaty competition rules.1 The recognition of this cause of action contributed to the 
adoption, in 2003, of the Modernisation Regulation (Council Regulation No 1/2003), which as part of 
its plans for the decentralisation of the enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU in toto, confirmed 
the relationship of complementarity between civil litigation and public enforcement as well as the 
restoration of harm rationale underscoring the damages' remedy.2  
        As is well-known, however, the 2003 Regulation did not bring about any harmonisation of the 
rules governing the procedures before the NCAs3 or indeed the civil proceedings lodged before 
national courts and in which the EU competition rules were invoked: in respect to the latter, 
Regulation No 1/2003 only laid out mechanisms of “soft cooperation” between the domestic courts 
and the EU Commission. Accordingly the lack of common rules governing court proceedings 
concerning the application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU has meant that, in accordance with the 
principle of national autonomy, different rules would apply.4    Consequently, the EU Commission 
called for the introduction of a common core of rules destined to create a “level -playing field” for 
potential claimants in competition cases.5  Its 2008 White Paper advocated for, among other 
proposals, the introduction of rules on the standing of direct and indirect purchasers, of mechanisms 
for the “aggregation” of low-value claims into the same civil action and of a common “minimum level 
of disclosure inter partes of relevant evidence, subject to judicial scrutiny, to correct the “information 
asymmetry” problem.6  It also envisaged conferring binding legal force as to the proof of the existence 
to NCAs decisions, along the lines of the position of Commission’s infringement findings 7 and doing 
away with any requirement for the claimant to prove fault on the part of the defendant.8  However, 
                                                                 
1 -453/99, Courage v Crehan, [2001] ECR I -6297, para. 25-26, 31-32; see also C-295/04, Manfredi ed altri  v 
Lloyd Adriatico ed altri, [2006] ECR 11421, para. 61, 64-65, 92-95. 
2 See e.g. White Paper on Modernisation (99/027) April  1999, available at: 
http://europa.eu/documents/comm/white_papers/pdf/com99_101_en.pdf, (hereinafter referred to as White 
Paper), pp. 16-17; see also p. 40; see also Green Paper on damages actions for the breach of the EC antitrust 
rules, (2005)COM0672, available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52005DC0672&from=EN (hereinafter referred to as Green Paper), para. 
1.2-1.3, 2.7. 
3 See Council Regulation No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition 
laid down in Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, [2003] OJ L1/1 (hereinafter referred to as Regulation No 1/2003), 
Preamble, Recital 16; see also Articles 11-12 and, for the domestic courts, Article 15.  For commentary, see e.g. 
Waelbroeck, "Twelve feet all  dangling down and six necks exceeding long", in Ehlermann and Atanasiu (Eds), 
European Competition Law Annual, 2002: Oxford, Hart, p. 470-471. 
4 See inter alia Eilmansberger, “The Green Paper on damages action for breach of the EC antitrust rules and 
beyond”, (2007) 44(2) CMLRev 431, especially pp. 439-440 and 477-478; more recently, mutatis mutandis, 
Ottanelli , “Follow-on antitrust damages’ actions and access to justice: i l lusion or reality?”, (2016) 22(1) Int. LTR 
1, pp. 2-3. 
5 Green Paper, cit. (fn. 2), para. 2.9; see also para. 2.3. 
6 Id., para. 2.2; see also para. 2.6 and 2.1. 
7 Id., para. 2.3. 
8 Id., para. 2.4; see also para. 2.5 
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the 2008 proposals failed to find a way into concrete legislative action, ostensibly out of a concern for 
avoiding the fragmentation of the domestic rules governing civil justice and in accordance with 
important general principles of EU law, such as that of national autonomy. 9 
        The Member States, for their part, did not “stand by” in the face of growing concerns surrounding 
the continuing effectiveness of the Crehan cause of action10 but engaged in a lively debate as to what 
could be done to remedy the status quo in their jurisdictions and even resulted often in concrete 
legislative action being taken.11  A telling example of the growing awareness of these issues can be 
found in the experience of the United Kingdom, where the Competition Act 1998 was enacted and 
further reformed in 2002 with a view to making competition claims easier to lodge.  According to the 
extensive study conducted by Rodger and concerning the development of competition litigation in 
this jurisdiction, since the accession of the United Kingdom to the then EEC and until 2004 there had 
been a total of ninety 'competition cases' and eighty-six judgments had been handed down.12   
           The study showed that the enactment of the Competition Act 1998, while it had not led to an 
immediate increase in the rates of litigation, may have increased the level of awareness among 
potential claimants of the remedies available to them under EU and domestic competition law. 13 
Consequently, it was suggested that the slow but steady growth in new claims may have been owed 
to plaintiffs having become more inclined to "go to court" to seek relief of prima facie antitrust 
injuries.14  These initially rather lacklustre outcomes can be compared with evidence of the litigation 
rates in the years between, respectively, 2005 and 2008 and 2009 and 2012.15  In the former period a 
positive trend in the number of new cases as well as of judgments being given was highlighted, with 
41 decisions being handed down and 27 new cases being lodged in the courts. 16     
            Importantly, the study found that a relative majority of cases had been litigated before the 
ordinary civil courts and not in the CAT—respectively, twenty-five against nine.17  As for follow-on 
cases, it was further observed that, despite the efforts being made toward making this forum more 
accessible, only four out of the six cases of this nature had been lodged with the Tribunal. 18  These 
trends did not appear to change for the period between 2009 and 2012: it was shown that to the 
steady increase registered up until 2009 a “peak” had followed in 2010 and  2011, with, respectively, 
fourteen and sixteen new claims.  Overall, Rodger found that in this period forty-four new judgments 
had been delivered.19  It was also suggested that, for England and Wales, the High Court had emerged 
as the forum “of choice” for the majority of these cases, as opposed to the CAT.20  Broadly consistent 
                                                                 
9 See European Parliament resolution of 26 March 2009 on the White Paper on damages actions for breach of 
the EC competition rules, 2008/2154/INI, available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P6-TA-2009-
0187+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN, especially sections C and H; also Eilmansberger, cit. (fn. 4), pp. 441-442. 
10 Study on the conditions of claims for damages in case of infringement of the EC competition rules, 31 August 
2004, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/comparative_report_clean_en.pdf  (hereinafter 
referred to as ‘Ashurst report’), para.1. 
11 See e.g., for the United Kingdom, Rodger, ‘Competition law litigation in the UK’ (2006) 27(5) European 
Competition Law Review 235 at 237. 
12 Id., pp. 243-244. 
13 Id., p. 244. 
14 Rodger, ibid., Part III of the study, (2006) 27(7) GCLR 341 at 349.  
15 Rodger, “Competition law litigation in the UK courts”, (2009) 2(2) GCLR 93 and (Part II) 2(3) 136; 
“Competition law litigation in the UK courts: a study of all  cases 2009 -2012”, (2013) 6(2) GCLR 55. 
16 Rodger, cit. (fn. 15), Part I, p. 96. 
17 Id., p. 98. 
18 Id., pp. 100-101.  
19 Rodger, cit. (fn. 15) (2013), p. 57. 
20 Rodger, loc.ult.cit., p. 96. 
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with the steady growth in litigation rates was also the increased frequency of out-of-court settlements 
for competition disputes and especially for follow-on claims.21  
        Against this background, while it can certainly be agreed with Rodger’s observations that the state 
of the UK civil competition litigation is still in a state of “relative infancy” there have been significant 
signs of growth in this area.22  It is added that the legislative reform agenda initiated in 2012, which 
eventually led to the root-and-branch reform of the UK’s public enforcement framework, blew more 
wind in the sails of the development of private antitrust litigation.23  The 2015 Consumer Rights Act, 
which was built on the all-important set of proposals concerning civil litigation in the field of 
competition, tabled by the Government in 2013, encompassed all the key features of competition 
cases, ranging from the rules on standing to those on settlements;24 perhaps most importantly, it 
boosted the role of the CAT, by conferring it the power to hear all competition claims, including the 
stand-alone ones, and aimed to empower small claimants by laying out an “opt-out” style collective 
action which could be brought before the Tribunal, subject to stringent admissibility scrutiny. 25 
           The above analysis can be read as suggesting that United Kingdom, just as other member states, 
has made significant efforts to facilitate the recourse to civil justice and more generally to private 
mechanisms for the cessation of anti-competitive practices and for the restoration of harm arising 
from these forms of illegal behaviour.26  It is submitted that these developments occurring at domestic 
level were neither unexpected nor contrary to EU law: they were not unexpected due to the growing 
importance of civil competition claims and more generally of safeguarding the rights of consumers 
more generally at national and at EU level.27  Nor were they inconsistent with EU law: as was 
anticipated, the principle of national autonomy expressly safeguards the power of the member states 
to determine the conditions of access to justice for individuals whose rights founded in EU law have 
been infringed, albeit subject to caveats of effectiveness and of equivalence.28   
         It is however equally apparent that the emergence of numerous and diverse legislative initiatives 
in each of the member states created the risk of inconsistency in the way in which the rights of the 
antitrust victims would be protected across the internal market.29   As a result, it was not surprising 
that despite the difficulties that it had hitherto encountered, the EU Commission would push once 
again for the minimum harmonisation of the rules governing selected aspects of competition 
                                                                 
21 Id., p. 92-93. 
22 Rodger, cit. (fn. 15), p. 65. 
23 Id., p. 66. 
24 Consumer Rights Act 2015, Chapter VIII.  See e.g. UK Government, Dept. for Business, Innovation and Skil ls, 
“Private actions in competition law: a consultation on options for reform—Government response”, February 
2013, available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/70185/13 -501-private-
actions-in-competition-law-a-consultation-on-options-for-reform-government-response1.pdf, see e.g. para. 
6.42-6.45; also 5.17-5.23. 
25 Id., see Chapter 4. 
26 See e.g., for Italy, Codice del Consumo (Consumers’ Code), approved with Decreto Legislativo (Statutory 
Instrument) No. 206 of 6 September 2005, last updated by Decreto Legislativo No. 21 of 21 February 2014; see 
also the study conducted by Peyer in respect of the position in Germany: Peyer, “Myths and untold stories —
private antitrust enforcement in Germany”, UEA—Centre for Competition Policy Working Paper No 10-12, 
available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1672695. 
27 See inter alia Commission Recommendation on common principles for injunctive and compensatory 
collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning the violation of rights granted under EU law, 
11 June 2013, (2013/396/EU), available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32013H0396&from=EN, see especially Preamble, Recital 1 and 12-14. 
28 See e.g., mutatis mutandis, case C-312/93, Peterbroeck and others v Belgium, [1995] ECR I -4599, para. 12. 
29 See Directive 2014/104/EU on antitrust damages actions, [2014] OJ L349/1 (hereinafter referred to as 2014 
Directive), Preamble, Recital 8; see also Impact Assessment Report accompanying the Draft Directive 
(COM(2013) 404 final), para. 52-55; Draft Directive, pp. 8-9; see also, inter alia, Kortmann and Swaak, “The EC 
White Paper on antitrust damages: why the Member States have a right to be (less than ) enthusiastic”, (2009) 
30(7) ECLR 340 at 350-351. 
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litigation, so that the “inequalities and uncertainty concerning the conditions under which” these 
claims should be brought would be addressed.30  The next section will provide an overview of its 
provision and concentrate on the rules aimed at correcting the “information asymmetry” that often 
exists among the litigants in these cases where the evidence tends to be complex and within the 
control of the defendant. 
 
2.2. The 2014 Directive on competition damages at a glance... 
 
The previous section provided a summary account of the attempts to facilitate the bringing of 
competition lawsuits made both at EU and at member states' level.  This section will discuss briefly 
the key aspects of the 2014 Directive.  It may be noted, first of all, that in comparison with earlier 
proposals the Directive focused only on a selected number of areas that had been regarded as 
potentially hindering access to justice for antitrust victims.31  According to the Directive’s Preamble, 
its overarching goal is to achieve a “level-playing field” in respect of the rules governing these claims 
so that the risk of forum shopping can be reduced:32  its purpose is therefore to set out a core of 
minimum safeguards for plaintiffs in respect of issues of standing, disclosure of evidence and 
limitation periods and of the complex interplay between enhancing civil litigation and maintaining 
effective public enforcement, albeit within the overarching principle of national autonomy. 33    
          It may also be noted that, unlike earlier attempts at introducing similar harmonising legislation, 
the Directive provides a reasoned justification as to its legal basis and as to the measure’s compliance 
with principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.  The EU legislature identified as joint legal bases 
the two provisions of Article 103(1) and 114 TFEU, concerning, respectively, the power to adopt 
measures aimed at giving effect to the Treaty’s own competition rules and the power to harmonise 
those aspects of domestic law that, whether actually or potentially, could hamper the good 
functioning of the internal market.34  The Assessment Document accompanying the Draft Directive 
stated that recourse only to Article 103 TFEU, which dealt with the Union’s exclusive competence 
adopt competition policy measures, would not have been sufficient to justify adopting measures in 
this area.35  It was stated that since the maintenance of such an “uneven playing field” as to how these 
claims could be lodged could have distorted the functioning of the internal market, recourse to Article 
114 TFEU would have provided a necessary, additional legal basis to justify action in this field. 36    
          As to the issue of compliance with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, the 
Directive’s Preamble went beyond generic assertions as to the “underdevelopment” of private 
competition enforcement and instead identified specific aspects in respect of which the introduction 
of common rules in this area is going to bring "significant added value".  It was stated that a uniform 
discipline as to the interaction between civil litigation and public enforcement would have provided a 
consistent solution to the question of how these two tools for the application of the competition rules 
could have been coordinated with a view to securing uniform standards of effectiveness of public 
                                                                 
30 Impact Assessment report, cit. (fn. 29), p. 8. 
31 See inter alia Jones, “Private enforcement of EU competition law: a comparison with, and lessons from the 
US”, TLI Think Paper 10/2016, available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2715796, pp. 17-18. 
32 See Draft 2014 Directive, cit. (fn. 29), p. 12; see also Impact Assessment Report, cit. (fn. 29), para. 194 -195. 
33 Ibid.; for commentary, see e.g., mutatis mutandis , Slot, “Does the Pfleiderer judgment make the fight against 
cartels more difficult?”, (2013) 34(4) ECLR 197 at 205 -206. 
34 See Directive 2014/104/EU on antitrust damages actions, [2014] OJ L349/1 (hereinafter referred to as 2014 
Directive), Preamble, Recital 8; see also Impact Assessment Report accompanying the Draft Directive 
(COM(2013) 404 final), para. 52-55; Draft Directive, cit. (fn. 29) pp. 8-9; see also, inter alia, Kortmann and 
Swaak, “The EC White Paper on antitrust damages: why the Member States have a right to be (less than) 
enthusiastic”, (2009) 30(7) ECLR 340 at 350-351. 
35 Impact Assessment Report, cit. (fn. 29), p. 8. 
36 Ibid.; see also p. 10. 
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enforcement and especially to safeguards the role of leniency programmes as a detection tool for 
competition infringements.37   
           The choice of a Directive was also considered compatible with the principle of proportionality: 
as regards its content, the Commission submitted that by adhering to the goal of “effective 
compensation” it remained consistent with the purely restorative function of the damages’ remedy 
that is prevalent in the Member Sates’ legal traditions.38  In addition, to the extent that it set a range 
of binding objectives, it left the Member States with a sufficiently wide measure of discretion in 
deciding to what extent and how to take action to seek them.  In the Commission’s view the choice of 
a Directive (…) [was] in line with the principle that there should be as little intervention as possible, so 
long as the objectives [were] achieved”.39  
           As to its substantive content, the Directive reiterates a number of key principles that has already 
been recognised by the CJEU as part of the EU law acquis, namely the eminently restorative nature of 
the damages' remedy as a means of compensation and not of punishment, the conferral of standing 
to bring an action for damages to "anyone who has suffered harm" as a result of anti -competitive 
practices and the requirement that compensation be "effective" and thereby encompass both the 
actual loss suffered by the victim and any lost profits, along with interest.40  Paramount to the 
assessment of harm and in general to all the aspects of a competition claim that have not been 
expressly affected by the Directive is the principle of national autonomy, according to whi ch it is for 
national law to determine, among other issues, the burden and standard of proof as to the existence 
of the elements of each claim, such as, inter alia, the existence of a causal link between an 
infringement and the loss claimed by the plaintiff.41  This principle is however subject to the caveats 
of effectiveness and equivalence: domestic law should therefore not make the exercise of the right to 
obtain compensation for antitrust damages excessively difficult or subject it to conditions that are  
more onerous than those applicable to "equivalent" causes of action grounded in national law. 42 
          Accordingly, it is submitted that the Directive confirms the view of the competition damages' 
remedy as a "systemic tool" which, by securing effective compensation to those harmed as a result of 
restrictive practices, pursues broader goals of deterrence of future unlawful conduct. 43  It has been 
suggested that promoting access to justice for antitrust victims does not only allow them to receive 
compensation for their injuries, but also contributes to the overall chance of cartel detection.   For 
this purpose, the Directive sets out common minimum standards in several areas: in addition to the 
anticipated standing conditions and uniform rules concerning the quantification of harm and to the 
commitment to the principle of effectiveness, Article 10 sets out common principles in relation to 
limitation periods and Article 14 concerns the availability of a passing-on defence. Article 18 instead 
deals with the interplay between the non-judicial resolution of individual disputes and ongoing judicial 
proceedings; in this specific context, Article 19 limits the scope of the damages' liability of a settling 
defendant vis-a-vis the claimant or claimants with which a deal has been struck, thus derogating from 
the otherwise generally applicable principle of joint and several liability of all competition infringers.  
          One of the central planks of the minimum harmonisation framework enshrined in the 2014 
Directive is the commitment to ensuring a more "level-playing field" between the parties in cases that 
are normally complex and where evidence is usually within the control of only one litigant, usually the 
                                                                 
37 See id., pp. 11-12; also, e.g. Slot, “Does the Pfleiderer judgment make the fight against cartels mor e 
difficult?”, (2013) 34(4) ECLR 197 at 205-206. 
38 Impact Assessment Report, cit. (fn. 29), p. 12. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Article 1, 3(2), 2014 Directive; see also Lianos, Nebbia and Davis, Damages claims for the infringement of EU 
Competition Law, 2015: OUP, pp. 36-37. 
41 See Article 3(1) and 17(1), 2014 Directive; see also Preamble, Recitals 4 and 12. 
42 See e.g. Peterbroeck, cit. (fn. 28), para. 11-12. 
43 See Lianos at al., cit. (fn. 40), pp. 30-31; also, mutatis mutandis, case C-557/12, Kone et al. v OBB 
Infrastruktur, [2014] ECR I-1317, para. 32-33. 
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defendant.44  Thus, Article 5 of the Directive obliges the member states to provide for a mechanism of 
court-ordered disclosure of evidence that is "relevant" to the claim or defence advanced by the party 
seeking such disclosure and is within the control of another litigant or even a third party.  The trial 
court should assess each application in light of the strict criteria provided in Article 5(4), so as to avoid 
unduly restricting the right to a fair trial enjoyed by all parties and adversely affecting the 
confidentiality of "sensitive information".  Article 6 sets out a "special regime" governing the 
disclosure of evidence that is within the control of NCAs: in order to prevent the risk of "over-
enforcement" of the competition rules, the Directive introduces a number of special safeguards for 
evidence gathered in the course and for the purpose of competition investigations, by establishing 
that the latter cannot be disclosed until the investigation has been closed. 45   
          Perhaps more importantly, the Directive excludes outright "leniency statements" and 
"settlement proposals" from the type of evidence whose disclosure can be ordered by the trial court 
in the course of civil proceedings,46 thus addressing the broader question of how to enhance the role 
of civil litigation as a "systemic" tool for competition detection and deterrence without depriving the 
promise of immunity in exchange for cooperation as a means of boosting public enforcement. 47  
Ensuring the effective coordination between civil litigation and the action of competition agencies, 
while at the same time assisting claimants in establishing their case, is also at the basis of Article 9 of 
the Directive:48 this provision obliges the member states to recognise probative legal value as to the 
existence of a competition infringement to NCAs' decisions, for the purpose of proving liability in 
court.49  Article 11(2) further states that decisions adopted by competition agencies in different EU 
jurisdictions should provide prima facie evidence of a competition breach and therefore be subject to 
the appreciation of the trial court along with other relevant evidence.50 
           In light of the above analysis it may be concluded that while not being as wide -ranging as 
originally envisaged, the 2014 Directive seeks to enhance the role of competition litigation as a tool 
for the detection of competition infringements, through an increased threat of damages liability.  At 
its core is a concern for "levelling the playing field" between litigants, especially when it comes to 
accessing the evidence that in complex cases such as these is required to establish a damages' claim, 
and at the same time for maintaining the effectiveness of public enforcement.  It is however also 
apparent that to the extent that the Directive only sets out minimum common rules in a selected 
number of areas, its provisions, when transposed, are going to have to "interact", in accordance with 
the principle of national autonomy, with the domestic rules governing litigation in domestic courts 
and which are often substantially different from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.  The next sections will 
explore the implications of this prima facie "tension" between minimum harmonisation and normative 
diversity having regard to issues of accessibility of evidence that may be held by either one of the 
litigants or by a third party, including a NCA, so as to gauge to what extent the Directive is likely to 
achieve its goals of greater access to justice without impinging upon the fair and sound administration 
of justice in these cases. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                 
44 See 2014 Directive, Preamble, Recital 38. 
45 2014 Directive, Article 5; see especially Article 5(4); see also Preamble, Recital 34-35. 
46 Id., Article 6(4); see also Preamble, Recital 36; see also, mutatis mutandis, Recital s 38-39. 
47 Ibid.; see also Lianos et al., (cit. 40), pp. 232-233. 
48 2014 Directive, cit. (fn. 36), Preamble, recitals 32 ff. 
49 See also id., Recitals 32, 34. 
50 Id., recitals 34-35. 
8 
 
3. Powers of disclosure of evidence in competition cases after the 2014 Directive: “walking on a 
tightrope”? 
 
3.1. Judge-ordered disclosure of litigant-held documents: balancing the principle of ‘equality of 
arms’ with the right to a fair trial for all litigants 
 
The previous sections provided a brief overview of the complex path that eventually led to the 2014 
Directive on competition damages actions and outlined its main features.  It was highlighted how one 
of its core objectives is the concern for correcting the information asymmetry that usually arises 
between the plaintiff and the defendant.  The purpose of this section will be to analyse the rules 
contained in Articles 5 and 6 of the 2014 Directive, which enshrine a common minimum standard 
governing the disclosure of the evidence that may be within the “control” of one of the litigants or of 
a third party so that this perceived inequality can be redressed without impairing the effectiveness of 
other detection and enforcement instruments.51   
          According to Article 5(1) the member states must empower the “competent authorities” (such 
as the domestic courts having jurisdiction to hear competition law disputes) to order, upon 
application, to another litigant or to a third party to hand over to the applicant any evidence that “lie 
within their control” so that the former can prove the existence of their claim or defence.  This power 
is however subject to a number of limits and safeguards aimed at reconciling the observance of the 
right of access to justice, in accordance with the principle of equality of arms and with general due 
process rules, with the overarching obligation to protect the confidentiality of “sensitive 
information”.52  Accordingly, the national court must be satisfied that the applicant’s claim is 
“plausible” and is supported by a “reasoned justification, containing reasonably available facts and 
evidence” of a prima facie case.  The applicant must also be able to point to precisely identified items 
of evidence or to “identifiable categories of evidence”.     
          To avoid the risk of “fishing expeditions” Article 5(3) and (4) oblige domestic judges to consider 
the legitimate interests of all parties and thus to have regard to whether the request is warranted in 
light of the nature of each claim and of the supporting evidence as well as to the scope and costs 
linked to the proposed disclosure.  The court must also examine whether the requested evidence is 
likely to be relevant for the litigants and, if its nature is “sensitive”, it can devise “arrangements (…) 
for protecting such confidential information (…)”.     The forgoing analysis indicates that in an effort to 
provide a “minimum level of disclosure inter partes”53 Article 5 threads a fine line between 
considerations of due process and sound administration of justice, to the benefit of all litigants,54 and 
the concern for allowing those among them that are weaker and more disenfranchised to obtain the 
evidentiary material they require to substantiate their claim.55   
          The approach enshrined in the Directive may be compared with the interpretation of the 
‘equality of arms’ rule adopted by the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) in respect of EU public 
competition enforcement: as was reiterated by the General Court in, among other cases, the very 
                                                                 
51 See e.g., mutatis mutandis, 2008 EU Commission White Paper, cit. (fn. 2), para. 2.2; see also Lianos et al., cit. 
(fn. 40), p. 240. 
52 See 2014 Directive, cit. (fn. 29), Preamble, Recital 23; see also Recitals 21 and 22. 
53 2008 EU Commission White Paper, cit. (fn. 2), para. 2.2. 
54 See 2014 Directive, cit. (fn. 29), Preamble, recital 15, 16 and 19. See also Proposal for a Directive, available 
at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2013:0404:FIN:EN:PDF, p. 4; for commentary 
see inter alia Vandenborre et al., “Actions for antitrust damages within the European Union”, (2014) 7(1) GCLR 
1, especially pp. 3-4. 
55 See inter alia Gamble, “The European embrace of private enforcement”, (2014) 35(10) ECLR 469, especially 
pp. 478-479; also id., “The Parliament, the Commission and the Court - three institutions and their effect on 
private enforcement of anti -competitive conduct in the EU”, (2015) 36(12) ECLR 501, pp. 503 -504; see also 
Juska, “The future of collective antitrust redress: something new under the sun?”, (2015) 8(1) GCLR 14 at 23 -
24. 
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recent Re: Bathroom Fittings Cartel appeal decision,56 “it cannot be for the Commission alone to 
decide which documents are of use for the defence” of the investigated undertakings; consequently, 
the latter must be able to decide whether or not to use any of these docume nts to deny the existence 
of (and the ensuing liability for) the alleged breach.57   
         As a result, the investigated undertakings should be allowed access to the case file according to 
the same rules that apply to the investigating authority and subject only to limits dictated by “weighty” 
concerns for the continuing protection of commercially sensitive material whose disclosure can 
jeopardise present or future cartel detection.58  The forgoing analysis can be read as suggesting that 
Article 5(3) and (4) respond to the same concern, albeit in the different context of civil litigation, since 
they aim to balance consideration of effectiveness in the public enforcement of the competition rules 
with the demands of access to justice for victims of anti -competitive behaviour,59 so that they can 
effectively exercise the right, granted to them by EU law, to claim compensation for the loss  they 
suffered as a result of the infringement of the Treaty antitrust rules. 60 It is however equally clear that 
to the extent that the Directive brings about the harmonisation, albeit minimal, of the rules concerning 
the disclosure of evidence in competition cases, it is destined to interact with often diverse principles 
and approaches governing the power of domestic courts, in accordance with tenets of “due process”, 
to determine the limits of a dispute pending before them and in particular the identification and 
acquisition of the evidence required to allow them to adjudicate individual claims.61  In addition, it is 
suggested that the Directive’s renewed commitment to observing the EU principle of national 
autonomy requires that these rules be implemented in accordance with the requirements of 
effectiveness and equivalence.62  
          Although the limited remit of this contribution does not allow for any in-depth analysis of these 
issues in light of the various domestic regimes in force across the EU, it is helpful to draw a summary 
comparison between the relevant rules in force, respectively in Germany and (for proceedings 
pending before the High Court) in England and Wales.  German civil procedure does not impose any 
obligation on the parties to disclose relevant information and evidence either in advance of or during 
a trial, with limited exceptions.  Thus, the Civil Code allows plaintiffs to “inspect documents in 
possession of another person”, but only if it can be shown that these documents were created “in the 
interest of the claimant”63 and their discovery is necessary to establish the “truth” of the facts at issue 
in the trial.64  Nonetheless, this power cannot be exercised in a way that unduly interferes with the 
right to privacy enjoyed by the litigant from which disclosure is sought and, more generally, with 
principle of “procedural economy”.65 
            Having regard to competition cases, the courts have come to recognise that a general 
requirement of “good faith” requires the defendant to disclose to a plaintiff who has successfully 
established the existence of an infringement the evidence that may be necessary to establish other 
elements of the claim, such as the quantum of damages, disclosure seems on the whole difficult to 
obtain.66 As to the disclosure of document held by the competition agency, a party to civil proceedings 
can petition the Bundeskatellamt to disclose any document contained in the case file that may be 
                                                                 
56 Case T-379/10, Keramag and others v Commission, [2013] ECR II -457. 
57 Id., para. 265. 
58 See e.g. id., para. 262-263, 278. 
59 Ibid.; see also, among others, case T-410/03, Hoechst v Commission, [2008] ECR II -88, para. 145. 
60 See e.g. Lianos et al., cit. (fn. 40), pp. 22-24; see also p. 29-30. 
61 See inter alia Guttuso, "The enduring question of access to leniency materials", (2014) 7(1) GCLR 10, pp. 17-
18. 
62 See inter alia case C-473/00, Cofidis, [2002] ECR I-10875, para. 28, 35-36. 
63 Rodger (ed), Competition law comparative private enforcement and collective redress across the EU, 2014: 
Leuven, Kluwer Law International, pp. 48-50. 
64 See Guttuso, cit. (fn. 61), p. 17. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Rodger, cit. (fn. 63), pp. 48-49. 
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relevant to his or her claim, with the exception of leniency   statements and of any document whose 
revelation may prejudice an ongoing investigation.67   
       The position in Germany may be contrasted with the rules in force in England and Wales: having 
regard to proceedings before the High Court Part 31 of the Crown Procedure Rules (CPR) obliges every 
litigant to disclose all the evidence that is “relevant to the litigation, including [documents] that harm 
his own case or support the other party’s case”.68  Disclosure can also be ordered by the trial judge 
and failure to comply with this obligation can lead to an array of adverse consequences for the 
defaulting party: these encompass the inability to “rely on an undisclosed document” to being found 
in contempt of court.69  The trial court, however, can, when ordering discovery of evidence, grant 
appropriate safeguards for “sensitive” documents: it can, inter alia, redact these documents or restrict 
their access to a limited number of individuals.70   
        Having regard to proceedings before the Competition Appeals Tribunal (CAT), it may be noted 
that that the revised Rules of Procedure, adopted in 2015 after the enactment of the Consumer Rights 
Act, have boosted the Tribunal’s powers in this area:71 thus, according to the new Rule 21, the Tribunal 
can give "directions" to the parties in respect to, inter alia, the "issues on which it requires evidence" 
and in that context can decide "whether it would be just and proportionate" to admit or exclude any 
relevant items of proof.72  The CAT can examine whether any "prejudice" could derive to one or more 
of the litigants "if the evidence was admitted or excluded" and assess whether, if specific evidence 
was not available to it, it can still adjudicate the dispute.73  In addition, the Tribunal can rely on its 
strong case-management powers to, inter alia, require the “full and early disclosure” of the parties’ 
pleadings, determine relevant factual and legal issues as early as practical, to call witnesses and to 
order the production of any necessary document.74   
       The brief analysis conducted so far indicates that the discovery rules in force in England and Wales 
allow the litigants relatively wide rights in respect of accessing “relevant” evidence in the course of as 
well as before trial.  Nonetheless, it should be emphasised that, whether the proceedings are lodged 
before the High Court or before the CAT, the party seeking disclosure cannot engage in any “fishing 
expeditions” but must identify clearly the documents s/he seeks to access and provide a justification 
as to why these are relevant to his or her claim or defence.75 The applicant must also explain why the 
case cannot be adjudicated without that evidence being produced.76 
        It is therefore submitted that Article 5 of the 2014 Directive represents a valiant attempt to 
balance concurring interests for, on the one hand, securing the observance of due process principles 
to the benefit of all litigants and, on the other hand, achieving the objective of f acilitating access to 
justice for antitrust victims.  It is argued that the disclosure mechanism envisaged by the Directive 
appears to place a justified restriction on the right to a fair trial, enjoyed by all parties to civil 
competition proceedings, in as much as it places a number of safeguards as to the way in which the 
trial court is going to exercise its powers, as well as laying out carefully crafted limits as to what 
                                                                 
67 Id., p.50. 
68 Id., p. 58. 
69 Guttuso, cit. (fn. 61), p. 18. 
70 Ibid. 
71 SI 2015/1648, available at: 
http://www.catribunal.org.uk/files/The_Competition_Appeal_Tribunal_Rules_2015.pdf.  
72 See inter alia 2013 UK Government Response, cit. (fn. 24), para. 4.6; see also 2015 CAT Rules of pro cedure 
(2015) No 1648, available at: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2015/1648/contents/made, e.g. Rule 21. 
73 Ibid.  For comment see inter alia Rodger, cit. (fn. 63), p. 272. 
74 Rule 53, CAT Rules, cit. (fn. 72); see e.g. Evidence submitted to the President of the CAT to the House of 
Lords Select Committee on the Constitution on 27 November 2003, available at: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200203/ldselect/ldconst/999/3111201.htm.   
75 See e.g. Hutchinson 3G UK Ltd v O2 UK Ltd, [2008] EWHC 55, especially para. 38, 40. 
76 Ibid.; see also para. 50-52. 
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documents are susceptible to being handed over by court order.77  It is however undeniable that how 
these objectives will be achieved in concreto depends on the way in which Article 5 will be transposed 
in the laws of each member state78 and in particular on the impact that this provision is likely to have 
on the diverse approaches to evidence questions in force in individual jurisdictions.79  
          Having regard to the position in the United Kingdom, a distinction may be drawn between the 
perspective impact of the Directive on the Rules of Procedure adopted for the Competition Appeal 
Tribunal, especially as a result of the 2015 reforms, and its implications for the application of the 
discovery rules in force for proceedings pending before the High Court in England and Wales.  In 
respect of the former, it is suggested that the existing rules, and in particular the new version of Rules 
21 and 53 already go a considerable way toward securing compliance with the minimum, common 
principles set out in the Directive.80  It is submitted that the emphasis placed on the need to assess 
disclosure applications in light of criteria of proportionality, fairness and having regard to the 
relevance of the evidence being sought to the applicant’s case is broadly consistent with the objectives 
and the approach characterising the Directive and in particular for the concern, clearly expressed by 
the EU legislature, for providing a balanced solution to the question of how to reconcile the demands 
of “due process” with the right of access to justice, especially for those plaintiffs who may be unable 
to access secret and often complex evidence.81 
            As to the potential impact that the Directive could have on the High Court’s Rules of Procedure, 
it was anticipated that CPR 31 provides for a relatively generous discovery mechanism, which, at least 
in the face should contribute to securing the central objectives of the Directive and in particular uphold 
common criterial of ‘fairness’ and ‘proportionality’.82  Some commentators, however, argued that, on 
a closer look, the Directive, once transposed in domestic law, may actually result in a higher threshold 
for claimants seeking to have access to evidence ‘within the control’ of other litigants or of third 
parties, to the extent that it requires applicants to provide “facts and evidence” in support of their 
claims when petitioning for disclosure—a requirement that is not encompassed by the domestic rules 
of procedure.83   It was suggested, not without merit, that this prima facie conflict is likely to be 
resolved when the Directive is implemented:  commentators expressed the view that if the competent 
authorities regarded CPR 31 as being sufficient, in its current state, to meet the requirements of Article 
5, no change would likely intervene.84  However, they also pointed out that an amendment to the 
domestic civil procedure rules could not be excluded: although it was acknowledged that a concern 
for consistency could justify changing the relevant procedural rules so as to incorporate the conditions 
enshrined in Article 5, it was submitted that this change could lead to the imposition of an additional 
hurdle on the party seeking disclosure, thus potentially challenging the requirement of effectiveness. 85  
              It is added that the transposition of Article 5 is likely to lead to even greater inroads with 
established domestic procedural rules in Germany: as was illustrated earlier, while the trial court can 
identify the issues at stake in individual cases, along with the evidence required to prove claims and 
defences linked to them, the judge’s power to order disclosure of specific documents is strictly limited, 
ostensibly out of a concern for upholding general principles of procedural economy and constitutional 
                                                                 
77 See inter alia 2013 UK Government Response, para. 4.6; see also 2015 CAT Rules of procedure (2015) No 
1648, available at: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2015/1648/contents/made, Rules 21 and 53; for 
commentary, see inter alia Rodger, cit. (fn. 63), p. 272. 
78 See e.g., mutatis mutandis, 2014 Directive, cit. (fn. 29), Impact Assessment document, para. 49 -52. 
79 See inter alia, Komninos, "Effect of Commission Decisions on private antitrust l itigation: setting the story 
straight", (2007) 44 (5) CMLRev 1387, pp. 1419-1420. 
80 See 2015 CAT Rules of procedure (2015) No 1648, available at: 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2015/1648/contents/made, especially Rule 21. 
81 See e.g. Kwan, “The damages’ Directive: end of England’s eminence?”, (2015) ECLR 455, pp. 458 and, mutatis 
mutandis, p. 459. 
82 Id., p. 458-459. 
83 Id., p.  460. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid.  
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safeguards of privacy.86  Against this background, it is submitted that the implementation of Article 5 
could lead to a significant departure from this rather strict approach to court-ordered disclosure of 
evidence by requiring the trial court to balance these important safeguards against concerns for the 
access to justice of individual applicants and for the continuing observance of the EU law principle of 
effectiveness.  Although it may be agreed with commentators that this outcome could be in itself 
positive for the victims of anti-competitive behaviour,87 it is admittedly unclear at this stage to what 
extent the Directive’s objectives will be fulfilled in the framework of German civil procedure, which 
appears, instead, to be characterised by a vision of the trial court as a “less proactive” actor (albeit for 
entirely legitimate reasons) than in other jurisdictions.88   
           In light of the forgoing analysis it may be concluded that Article 5 of the Directive must certainly 
be welcomed as a means of redressing the imbalance between litigants in competition cases as 
regards the availability of the evidence that may be “relevant” for their claims or defences.  However, 
it leaves many questions open as to how its provisions will be implemented in each member state, 
where these issues have been dealt with in often very different ways.  The “tension” between the 
commitment to a more “level-playing field” across the EU and the continued observance of the 
principle of national autonomy, together with concerns for maintain an effective public enforcement 
of the competition rules, seems to emerge even more clearly when it comes to a “special category” of 
evidence, namely ‘leniency statements’ and, more generally, documents within the control of 
competition authorities.  The issues arising from the interplay of these concurring, if not competing 
concerns will be examined more closely in the next section. 
 
3.2. Coordinating private litigation and public enforcement in competition cases: disclosure of 
NCA-held evidence and Article 6 of the 2014 Directive—the case of leniency documents 
 
The previous section analysed the approach adopted by the 2014 Directive in respect of the disclosure 
of evidence relevant to a competition claim or defence in civil proceedings.  It was illustrated that 
while the Directive aims to engender minimum harmonisation in this area, significant uncertainty 
surrounds the outcome of its transposition, due to the diverse approaches that have prevailed in the 
Member States’ jurisdictions.     It is observed that the possibility for litigants to petition the courts 
with a view to obtaining the disclosure of evidence he ld by “third parties” raises the additional, all-
important question of the extent to which this power may be deployed with a view to obtaining access 
to evidence gathered by NCAs in the course of their competition investigations. 89  
           The purpose of this section will be to analyse some of these issues in light of the more general 
concern of how public competition enforcement and private antitrust litigation can be reciprocally 
coordinated. In particular, it will be investigated whether and how allowing claimants to obtain 
evidence contained in the NCAs’ “case files” in the interest of a full access to justice, can be reconciled 
with equally weighty concerns for maintaining the secrecy of their investigation, a factor which is 
fundamental to allow their enquiries to be exhaustive and effective in terms of cartel detection. 90 In 
this context, regard will be had especially to the position of leniency statements.  
         In general, it may be noted that antitrust victims often consider documents contained in the  case 
file of the competition agencies to be ‘objet du desire’ as they seek to build their case against a 
defendant who is either under investigation or has been already sanctioned by the competent NCA 
                                                                 
86 See e.g. Guttuso, cit. (fn. 61), p. 17; also Rodger, cit. (fn. 63), p. 49. 
87Matkasch et al., “The new EU directive on cartel damages claims from a German law perspective”, (2015) 
8(2) GCLR 60, p. 67-68. 
88 Id., p. 64. 
89 See e.g., for the UK, 2013 Response, cit. (fn. 24), para. 7.1-7.3. 
90 See for the UK, id., para. 7.3; for the position adopted by the EU Court of Justice, see inter alia, case C -
110/10, Solvay SA v Commission, [2011] ECR I -10439, para. 48; also case T-67/10, JCB v Commission, para. 68; 
case T-36/91, ICI plc v Commission, [1995] ECR II -1847, para. 45-46, 97-99, 102-105. 
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before the civil courts.91  However, whether and on what legal basis they, as third parties vis-à-vis the 
competition proceedings, can claim access to these documents has been subject to great debate: 
having regard to the position vis-à-vis the EU Commission, the EU Courts recognised in principle that 
third parties could have such access.92     
              Nonetheless, no indication was given as to how this entitlement should be exercised, either 
before the EU Commission or in respect of NCAs’ investigations.93  The possibility that third parties 
could have sight of often “sensitive” information was regarded as requiring considerable caution: 
having regard to the parties subjected to investigation, the duty to keep evidence secret responded 
to demands of privacy and of their rights of defence, as well as to the need to protect their commercial 
interests.94   As to the position of third parties, the EU Courts have taken the consistent view that 
maintaining the secrecy of such information and subjecting it only to limited exceptions responded to 
the need for ensuring that a “steady flow of information” could reach the investigating officials 
without the fear of “reprisals”.95  The likelihood that damages claimants could obtain access to 
"leniency statements" and more generally to material akin to an "admission of guilt" as regards a 
competition law breach was considered even more problematic: on the one hand, it was argued, not 
without merit, that such access could have jeopardised the promise of immunity as a tool for securing 
greater cartel detection.96      On the other hand, it was objected that to refuse disclosure outright and 
in all cases could have led to a successful whistleblower enjoying an undue advantage by de facto 
being "shielded" from damages liability.97   
             These questions became even more urgent as a result of the evolution of the case law of the 
EU Courts. In the CDC and EnBW Energie decisions, the General Court considered whether and to what 
extent the generally applicable Transparency Regulation, i.e. Council Regulation No 1049/2001, could 
provide a third party with the possibility to obtain sight of documents held in the EU Commission’s 
case file, including leniency statements and documents reproducing their content.  In CDC,98 the Court 
expressed the view that, in general, the demands of the effectiveness of the Commission’s inquiries, 
if necessary through the promise of immunity, could act as a ground upon which to justify a restriction 
in the right of access to documents of the applicant:99 however, it took the view that for this purpose 
it would not have been sufficient for the Commission to provide a generic justification, based on the 
need to maintain the ongoing secrecy of current inquiries.100  Instead, the Commission was obliged to 
assess, on a case-by-case basis, whether the disclosure of specific documents, assessed one by one, 
could have harmed its investigations.101   
          The General Court’s position was, however, overturned by the Court of Justice in the EnBW 
appeal judgment:102  the CJEU took a remarkably more “enforcement friendly” view of the question 
of whether protecting the confidentiality of documents submitted in the course of cartel 
investigations.103  It held that the right of access to documents was not unlimited and could only be 
                                                                 
91 See inter alia Lianos et al., cit. (fn. 40), pp. 249-250. 
92 Id., pp. 251-252; see e.g. case T-353/94, Postbank NV v Commission, [1996] ECR II-921, especially para. 70-
72. 
93 Ibid. 
94 See inter alia, Postbank, cit. (fn. 92), para. 85-88. 
95 See inter alia, mutatis mutandis, case T-210/01, General Electric Ltd v Commission, [2005] ECR II -5575, para. 
650. 
96 EU Commission, Memorandum accompanying the Draft Directive on competition damages (2013), available 
at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2013:0404:FIN:EN:PDF, p. 14. 
97 See UK 2013 Response, para. 7.9-7.11. 
98 CDC Hydrogene Peroxide Cartel damage Claims v Commission, [2011] ECR II -8251. 
99 Id., para. 35-36. 
100 Id., para. 36; see also para. 49-51. 
101 Id., para. 71-72; see also para. 77.   See also case T-344/08, EnBW Energie v Commission, [2012] ECR II -242, 
para. 61-62. For commentary see inter alia Lianos et al., cit. (fn 40), pp. 264-265. 
102 Case C-365/12 P, [2014] ECR I-112, see para. 62-64. 
103 Ibid. 
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exercised in a way that was compatible with other relevant considerations, such as the legitimate 
interest to the ongoing secrecy of the Commission’s competition investigations. 104   
           The Court of Justice acknowledged that maintaining the efficacy of the damages’ remedy was 
central to the effective enforcement of the competition rules: nonetheless it held that the right to 
obtain compensation of antitrust damages could not act as an overriding public interest and thereby 
require the Commission to justify, for each item of evidence, why its disclosure should be withheld.  It 
was held that to the extent that the EU legislature had already “balanced out” these concurring 
interests by means of the Implementing Regulation (i.e. Council regulati on No 1/2003), as further 
given effect to by the relevant Commission secondary rules (namely, via Regulation No 773/2004), the 
Commission could “presume without carrying out a specific, individual examination of each of the 
documents (…), that disclosure of such documents will, in principle, undermine the protection of the 
commercial interests of the undertakings (…) and (…) of the purpose of the investigations”. 105  Unless 
the applicant could demonstrate that there was an “overriding public interest” in the revelation of an 
individual document, the Commission could have rejected a request of third party access to its 
investigation files, on grounds of prejudice to an ongoing investigation. 106  
            The above analysis suggests that, to the extent that third parties sought to rely on general 
principles of transparency and access to documents in EU law, concerns for the continuing efficiency 
of EU cartel detection were regarded by the CJEU as providing a reasoned justification to refusing to 
grant disclosure of documents contained in the Commission’s case file, including documents 
submitted as part of a leniency application.107  While the “presumption against disclosure” of these 
documents could be rebutted by the applicant, the Commission could issue a refusal  decision 
concerning a ‘bloc’ of documents, as opposed to having to consider one by one which one, if disclosed, 
could materially jeopardise the investigation.108  
           Similar questions also arose in respect of investigations occurring at domestic lev el, thus 
interrogating more general issues as to the interplay between effective access to justice and the 
requirements of the principle of national autonomy.  The Pfleiderer ruling concerned a preliminary 
reference made in the course of proceedings for the award of competition damages instituted before 
the German Courts.  The plaintiff had initially been granted access to the file held by the German NCA, 
including documents submitted as part of a plea for immunity in exchange for cooperation, for the 
purpose of preparing his civil claim.109     
           However, following a challenge of this decision, the domestic court sought the assistance of the 
Court of Justice as to whether the NCA was obliged to disclose all documents, including those being 
part of the leniency application, to the plaintiff.110   The Court of Justice observed that, in the absence 
of any EU-wide discipline, the matter of access to the file held by competition authorities investigating 
EU competition infringements was subject to national law, albeit in the context of and within the limits 
dictated by the principle of national autonomy.111 The Court recognised that exposure to civil liability 
could adversely affect the “propensity” of cartel members to take advantage of leniency programmes 
and thereby jeopardise their effectiveness as a detection tool.112      However, it also observed that 
regard should be had to the need to uphold the right to seek compensation for the damage suffered 
by third parties adversely affected by the consequences of cartel behaviour.113       
                                                                 
104 Id., para. 65-66; see also para. 80-83 and 92. 
105 Id., para. 93. 
106 Id., para. 100-101; see also para. 104-106. For commentary see e.g. Rey, The interaction between public 
and private enforcement of competition law, and especially the interaction between the interests of private 
claimants and those of leniency applicants”, (2015) 8(3) GLCR 109, p. 117. 
107 Ibid.; see also pp. 124-125. 
108 Id., p. 122; see also Lianos et al., cit. (fn. 40), p. 267. 
109 Case C-360/09, Pfleiderer, [2011] ECR I-5161, para. 9-15. 
110 Id., para. 17-18. 
111 Id., para. 23-24. 
112 Id., para. 25-26,. 
113 Id., para. 28-29. 
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           Consequently, a plaintiff seeking redress from competition damages should not be precluded 
outright from seeking access to documents obtained by the NCA as a result of a leniency application.  
Instead, it should be for the national courts to conduct a “weighing exercise (…) on a case by case basis 
according to national law” before granting or refusing such access, in order to ensure that the right to 
claim compensation be effective and governed by conditions that are no le ss favourable than those 
applicable to “equivalent” causes of action based on domestic law.114     These principles were broadly 
confirmed in the Donau Chemie preliminary ruling, 115 where the CJEU stated that to deprive, through 
a blanket ban, the competent court to carry out this “weighing up” exercise on a case-by-case basis, 
in light of the relevant domestic rules and of all the circumstances of the case would have made the 
right of the claimant to seek redress of her antitrust injury excessively difficult to exercise.116  It was 
held that while protecting the effectiveness of leniency programmes represented a legitimate interest, 
capable of limiting the reach of the judicial powers of disclosure, it could not have justified a 
“systematic refusal” to disclose relevant documents.117  To hold otherwise would have been 
tantamount as to allowing the defendant, who had already benefitted from the immunity—whether 
partial or total—from financial penalties to “circumvent” its duty to compensate the victims of his or 
her anti-competitive behaviour.118  
           The Pfleiderer and Donau Chemie preliminary rulings are of great importance since they confirm 
the pivotal role played by principles of national autonomy and judicial independence in all the key 
aspects of competition litigation, including those concerning the disclosure of evidence that is within 
the control of the competent NCAs.119  However, this approach was criticised as threatening the 
effectiveness of the promise of immunity from fines as a means of boosting the rates of detection and 
sanction of competition infringements.120   It was further argued that since the decision as to whether 
leniency statements or other evidence containing similar “admissions of guilt” had to be adopted in 
accordance with the relevant domestic rules, the uncertainty as to the outcome of similar requests in 
the jurisdictions of the various EU member states could have increased. 121  The domestic judicial 
practice that followed the Pfleiderer ruling provides a very telling example of how, due to the impact 
of the different rules governing disclosure of evidence, the “weighing up exercise” that the national 
courts are empowered to conduct as a result of the CJEU’s preliminary ruling may yield to different 
outcomes in each member state.122  
         In Pfleiderer the District Court of Bonn, after weighing up the competing interests pro- and 
against disclosure, as dictated by the CJEU in its preliminary ruling, rejected the application on the 
ground that the legitimate interest to maintain the secrecy of the case file and in particular of leniency 
statements should have enjoyed precedence over equally legitimate interests, such as the concern for 
greater access to justice for antitrust injury victims.123  It was argued that since the promise of 
immunity represented perhaps one of the few detection tools that “really worked”, allowing 
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disclosure of these document could have had a tangible, negative impact on the NCA’s enforcement 
action.124 
        The outcome of Pfleiderer can be compared with the English High Court’s stance in National 
Grid.125  Mr Justice Roth noted that a leniency applicant, like any other infringer of the competition 
rules, was not entitled to any “expectation of confidentiality” outside the NCAs’ proceedings and in 
the context of a court case especially.126 In his view, in assessing each disclosure application the court 
should have had regard to the general principle of ‘proportionality’ which, in accordance with CPR 31 
entailed two distinct questions: the trial judge should have considered whether the evidence could 
have been obtained from other sources and assessed whether the information being sought was 
relevant to the claim or defence pleaded by the applicant.127  On that basis the High Court allowed the 
applicant’s request: Roth J took into account the complexity of the case at hand, the secrecy of the 
cartel, the nature of the evidence and in that context the circumstance that the applicant wished to 
have sight of “excerpts” of the corporate statements that were contained in the confidential version 
of the infringement decision.128   
             As to the allied question of the extent to which disclosing such information could have had an 
adverse impact on the efficacy of leniency as a tool for detection, Mr Justice Roth acknowledged that 
disclosure could have had the “potential effect” of dissuading future applicants from taking advantage 
of the promise of immunity.129  However, he took the view that for a prima facie cartel member to 
forgo the possibility to obtain immunity from fines in exchange for cooperation out of a concern that 
his or her declarations could have been disclosed, at a later date, in the course of a hypothetical 
damages’ claim would have been an excessively risky gamble compared with the likelihood of being 
caught by the NCAs or the Commission.130  On that basis it was concluded that to withhold from an 
applicant evidence that was within the control of a ‘third party’—i.e. a NCA—and that was clearly 
‘relevant’ to their plea only on the sole ground that its disclosure could have had a potential, adverse 
impact on the efficacy of the NCA’s leniency policy would have jeopardised the right of the victims of 
anti-competitive behaviour to obtain redress of the harm they had suffered and thus have b een 
contrary with the general principle of effectiveness. 131 
         It is argued that the aftermath of Pfleiderer in, respectively, Germany and England shows very 
clearly the practical implications of conferring to the domestic courts the power to perform  the 
“balancing exercise” that the court-ordered disclosure of evidence requires without there being also 
a degree of harmonisation of the rules governing the conditions according to which information can 
be revealed. It was suggested that the outcomes reached in the German Pfleiderer case and in the 
English NGET dispute respectively were determined by the different approaches to disclosure of 
evidence in force in each jurisdiction:132 while the German Courts were strongly led by a concern for 
procedural economy and for safeguarding the privacy of the concerned parties, the English High Court 
was influenced by concerns for the inherent fairness of the proceedings as a whole, including the need 
to guarantee full access to justice to the claimant.133  It was emphasised that the principle of 
“proportionality”, enshrined in CPR 31, had allowed the High Court to assess in a more flexible and 
perhaps more “pragmatic” manner the likely impact that disclosing evidence could have had for the 
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continuing effectiveness of the leniency programme and to reconcile any potential dangers for public 
enforcement with the demands of allowing greater access to justice for antitrust victims. 134 
           In light of the forgoing analysis, it was not surprising that the Pfleiderer and the Donau Chemie 
rulings would be met with mixed views among commentators: some scholars welcomed the CJEU’s 
approach, albeit with caution, on the ground that the Court had provided a relatively flexible and at 
the same time “tightly policed” response to the  question of how to reconcile the effectiveness of 
leniency programmes with demands of access to justice for claimants adversely affected by the 
“information asymmetry” often characterising competition cases.135  Other commentators, along with 
several stakeholders, however, expressed concern at the uncertainty that could ensue from the 
Pfleiderer “balancing approach”, due to the continuing relevance of the principle of national autonomy 
and to the diversity existing among the laws of the member states in this area.136 It was also suggested 
that maintaining the secrecy of leniency documents could have been justified by concerns for the 
integrity of public enforcement,137 to exclude a priori the disclosure of this evidence could have been 
detrimental to attaining the goal of the damages' remedy, i.e. providing restoration of harm for 
antitrust victims.138 
          Against this background, it was inevitable that the question of the extent to which documents 
collected by a competition authority as a result of a leniency application and in particular statements 
akin to an “admission of responsibility” for an infringement could be disclosed in court proceedings 
would have been addressed by the 2014 Directive.  As was anticipated in section 2.2, the Directive 
obliges the member states to provide a “special regime” for discovery applications aimed at obtaining 
sight of documents held in the competition authorities’ case files.   Thus, the court seized with the 
application should assess whether the request relates to individual and well-identified documents as 
opposed to being “non-specific” in its subject matter, what purpose the request seeks to achieve—
and in particular whether it is instrumental to lodging a damages’ claim.  Perhaps more significantly, 
Article 5(4)(c) prescribes that the national court should consider to what extent revealing the 
documents in issue can affect public enforcement.   
          Article 6 singles out three categories of evidence:  according to its subsection 5, documents 
prepared by the investigated undertaking “specifically for proceedings before a competition 
authority” as well as those drawn up by the authority itself in the course of an investigation can only 
be disclose to the parties of a civil action in respect of which they may be relevant  after the 
investigation has been closed.  The same regime applies to “settlement submissions that have been 
withdrawn”.  The second group of documents encompasses “leniency statements” and “settlement 
submissions”.139  According to Article 6(6) these documents are absolutely immune from disclosure: it 
is for the trial court to assess the nature of the evidence being requested and thus to determine 
whether it falls within any of the above categories.140 According to Article 6(7), if a controversy arises 
as to whether a piece of evidence falls under subsection 6, the court can, after receiving a “reasoned 
request” detailing the grounds for disclosure from the interested litigant, ask the competition 
authority to have sight of the document and thereby adjudicate as to its nature.141  Furthermore, 
Article 6(8) expressly allows for the partial disclosure of documents containing statements that would 
be in themselves immune from disclosure, so that the latter can be redacted and the document be 
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acquired in the course of civil proceedings.142   The third, residual category of competition agency-held 
evidence encompasses “any other document”: these can be disclosed by court order at any time, upon 
an assessment as to their “relevance” and in light of the criteria laid out by  Article 5(3).143   
            In light of the forgoing analysis, it has been suggested that the 2014 Directive has opted for a 
“decentralised system managed by the national judiciary” as regards requests for the disclosure of 
evidence held by a competition authority.144  It was argued that the application of Articles 5 and 6 
relies on the central function fulfilled by the trial court, which thanks to the Directive enjoys powers 
of assessment of the relevance of the evidence vis-à-vis the scope and nature of the dispute and to its 
proportionality in light of the concurring demands of access to justice and of the continuing 
effectiveness of public enforcement that are both “strict” and “proactive”.145   It is however legitimate 
to query whether the absolute immunity from disclosure chose by the EU legislature as regards 
leniency documents is compatible with important general principles, such as the principle of 
effectiveness and also the right of access to a court, enshrined in Article 48 of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights.  According to commentators, preventing the disclosure tout court of these 
documents in the course of court proceedings has a number of advantages: it limits the uncertainty 
surrounding the position of whistle-blowers vis-à-vis future damages’ liability that had followed from 
the Pfleiderer decision; it also preserves the incentive to apply for leniency, with clear benefits for 
deterrence and, as a result, for maintaining a “steady stream” of follow on cases based on 
infringement decisions that had been adopted as a result of cooperation with cartel members.146  It 
was further suggested that the “blanket immunity” enshrined in Article 6(6) of the Directive would be 
compatible with a view of competition litigation as “ancillary” to public enforcement.147 
           Other authors, however, were very critical of the ban148 and questioned whether de facto 
subordinating civil litigation to public enforcement was compatible with the CJEU’s position, expressed 
in Courage and Manfredi and according to which antitrust damages claims were central to the 
effectiveness of the Treaty competition rules, without there being any “hierarchy” between the two 
functions.149  It was argued that while the importance of public enforcement should not have been 
ignored, the legitimate interest to fostering private litigation could not have been overlooked. 150  This 
concern was also raised by the European Parliament’s Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee: the 
Committee stated that while leniency programmes had proven decisive for detecting new competition 
infringements, they should not have resulted in successful whistle-blowers being “protected” more 
than it was necessary, i.e. by shielding them almost completely from the threat of damages’ liability. 151  
The Committee acknowledged that certain types of evidence merited confidential treatment; 
however, it took the view that no document should be excluded a priori from disclosure, it being a 
matter for the trial court to assess whether the party requesting its disclosure should have been 
granted sight of it, in light of its relevance to the extent to which it could have been obtained by any 
other means and of any other consideration related especially to the role of the competition agency 
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in detecting and sanctioning future breaches: to hold otherwise would also have created the risk of 
“denying justice” to those claimants who could not obtain the same evidence by other means. 152 
       The forgoing analysis appears to illustrate that the with the 2014 Directive the EU legislature has 
endeavoured to “favour” the demands of an effective public enforcement machinery”, which are 
admittedly well served by relying on the promise of immunity from fines in exchange for 
cooperation,153 at the expense of” promoting antitrust litigation as a means of upholding the 
effectiveness of the Treaty competition rules. 154   However, one cannot help but being concerned at 
the likely impact that the solution enshrined in Article 6(4) of the 2014 Directive may have for future 
claimants155 as well as more generally for the continuing observance of the principle of effectiveness, 
the latter in light especially of the complementary relationship existing between public and private 
competition enforcement.156      
              It has been suggested that the “balancing exercise” devised by the CJEU in Pfleiderer had been 
the Court’s “choice ‘in the absence of EU rules governing the matter’, the issue being left for the 
domestic legal systems of the member states” until such time as the Union adopted harmonisation 
measures in this area.157  To this view, however, it was objected that to the extent that the approach 
adopted in Pfleiderer was justified by the general principle of effectiveness, it would have been 
legitimately questionable whether the power conferred to the national courts to conduct such 
“balancing exercise” could have been set aside by legislation.158   On that basis it was therefore argued 
that the “blanket ban” provided by Article 6(4) of the 2014 Directive would have been difficult to 
justify especially in cases in which information that was both “relevant” and “necessary” for the party 
seeking access to it could not have been obtained in any other way than by way of a court order. 159  
          In light of the above analysis, it can be concluded that whether the Directive will achieve its 
stated objectives remains open to question.  It is acknowledged that just as in respect of the general 
rules on disclosure of evidence, much will depend on how its provisions will be transposed in domestic 
law. 160  Nonetheless, it is argued that the “enforcement friendly” approach enshrined in Article 6(4) 
may create the risk of “chilling” future claims, especially follow-on ones that may arise from the 
uncovering of complex and wide-ranging cartels.161  Although the concerns for legal certainty and 
predictability in the administration of leniency programmes are fully understandable and should be 
taken into due account, it is however open to question whether the “wholesale exclusion” from 
disclosure of this and other “sensitive evidence”, as outlined in Article 6 of the Directive, can be fully 
reconciled with the rights of all litigants, especially the “weaker” ones, to access relevant evidence 
without being placed at undue disadvantage vis-à-vis the other parties in the proceedings.162      
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4. The 2014 Directive on competition damages as a "compromise solution" between effective 
competition enforcement, access to justice and due process --tentative conclusions 
 
The challenge of facilitating the civil litigation of competition cases in the courts of the member states, 
which has been at the forefront of the Commission's competition policy agenda for a long time, has 
eventually found an albeit partial resolution in the 2014 Directive on competition damages.  As was 
illustrated in section 2, the Directive provides for the minimum harmonisation of a selected number 
of issues concerning the access to justice for antitrust claimants and the adjudication of competition 
disputes.  At the core of the EU legislature’s effort is the concern for boosting litigation rates without 
impairing the effectiveness of public enforcement or restricting the right to a due process enjoyed by 
all litigants (especially by defendants) more than is required to achieve the Directive’s policy goals.   
            Correcting the information asymmetry often characterising the relationship between plaintiffs 
and defendants in competition cases has proved to be central for the Directive’s drafters, due to the 
ongoing importance of the principle of national autonomy and to the need to ensure that any 
derogations from generally applicable rules of civil procedure, aimed at ensuring the full effectiveness 
of the “right to a court” recognised to antitrust victims, do not compromise the integrity of the 
adjudication of these claims and at the same time to ensure the full effectiveness of the “right to a 
court” recognised to antitrust victims.   
         The purpose of this contribution has been to analyse how the 2014 Directive has endeavoured 
to “thread the fine line” between these concurring—if not often prima facie conflicting—interests.  It 
was argued that conferring to the courts of all member states the power to order the disclosure of 
evidence that was “relevant” to a claim or a defence and could not be re asonably obtained in any 
other way was clearly consistent with the access to justice rationale underscoring the Directive itself 
and was in particular targeted at ensuring a “level-playing field” among litigants when it came to 
accessing information that was “essential” for them to prove their case before the court.   
       At the same time, it was acknowledged that, due to the continuing relevance of the principle of 
national autonomy and to the circumstance that the Directive only provided for minimum 
harmonisation in this area, whether this provision will actually achieve its objectives is going to depend 
on how the member states will decide to give effect to it.   Section 3.1 provided a brief examination 
of how the courts in, respectively, England and Wales and Germany have dealt with issues of discovery 
of evidence held by the competent competition agencies and in that context highlighted how the 
outcome of the adjudication was different in each jurisdiction.  On that basis, it was argued that even 
though the Directive is clearly committed to achieving goals of greater access to justice in accordance 
with broadly consistent standards of due process and “equality of arms” across the Union, how its 
provisions are going to impact on the often considerably diverse approaches to issues of disclosure 
existing in the legal systems of the various member states will be decisive for the achievement of 
objectives of greater access to a court and more effective “equality of arms” among litigants.  
          It is however suggested that the future implementation of Article 6, concerning more specifically 
the court-ordered disclosure of documents held by NCAs, including “sensitive evidence” such as 
leniency statements, is likely to be even more complex.  Section 3.2 exam ined the “special regime” to 
which requests concerning the disclosure of these documents are subjected in light of the approach 
adopted by the CJEU in Pfleiderer and Donau Chemie: on that basis it was acknowledged that, on the 
one hand, continuing to safeguard the promise of immunity as a means of eliciting cooperation and 
thereby facilitating cartel detection would have been indispensable especially in order to encourage 
follow-on litigation.   On the other hand, it was emphasised that to subject leniency documents to an 
absolute ban against disclosure, without the trial court having any power to consider whether 
concerns of access to justice could be counterbalanced against the demands of effective public 
enforcement, may jeopardise the achievement of the central goal of the Directive, namely to facilitate 
claimants as they seek to build their case before the domestic courts, as well as to contradict the 
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general principle of effectiveness, especially in cases where the plaintiff was particularly “weak” in 
terms of his or her ability of obtaining access to relevant evidence.  
         It can therefore be concluded that the 2014 Directive represents an ambitious attempt to 
strengthen the right to seek compensation enjoyed by victims of anti -competitive behaviour.  
Nonetheless, it remains in many ways a "compromise solution" whose success (especially when it 
comes to addressing the “information asymmetry” existing between litigants) 163 is likely to depend 
significantly on the way in which the Member States' authori ties will decide to give effect to its 
objectives,164 each within the framework of principles governing civil proceedings, both generally and 
more specifically for competition cases.  165   
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